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The Representation of Hercules 
Ockham’s Critique of Species 
 
 
 
A defining feature of our acts of thought and perception, is their object-directedness. 
Thought is never just thought, and perceptions are never just perceptions: instead, thoughts 
have objects that they are about, and acts of perception are directed at things in external 
reality that they make us conscious of. One way of thinking about this, is to say that 
perception and thought are essentially mechanisms that we have at our disposal to represent 
the world we live in. In seeing or thinking about an object or a state of affairs, we represent 
it, and this is what gives these acts of cognition their characteristic intentionality.  
 To be sure, saying that perception and thought are means to represent the world 
raises the question of just how this works, and this was a question hotly discussed by 
scholastic philosophers in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Building on 
Aristotle’s idea that all cognition involves the assimilation of subject to object of cognition, 
many thinkers adhered to some version of the so-called theory of species. Roughly, this is the 
theory according to which perception and thought result when our cognitive powers are 
informed by species: representational devices that function as similitudes or resemblances of 
external objects, and which thus contribute to the assimilation of a cognizing subject to the 
entity that he perceives or thinks about.1  
 But in spite of its respectable Aristotelian ancestry and its detailed development by 
such philosophers as Roger Bacon and Thomas Aquinas, the theory of species also met with 
extensive critique from Franciscan philosophers such as Peter Olivi (1248-1298), Peter Auriol 
(1280-1322), and William of Ockham (1288-1347). These thinkers were worried about the 
precise role that the species or similitudes of their opponents were supposed to play in the 
process of representing reality. Olivi and Auriol, for example, took the theory of species to 
say that seeing or thinking of a tree involves both an act of perception or thought, and a 
species representative of the tree. And this made them wonder how the act and the species 
were supposed to relate. In particular, they feared that the species would become inner 
objects of our thoughts and perception, thus blocking direct access to external reality.2 To 
avoid this consequence, they argued that external objects were represented to us, not by 
means of special devices such as species, but by means of our very acts of perception and 
thought themselves. For the cognitive representation of the tree in front of me, they argued, 
                                                          
1 On Aquinas’s version of this theory, see D. Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, Vittorio 
Klöstermann, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 31-106. For a general historical overview, see L. Spruit, 
Species Sensibilis. Volume 1: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, Brill, Leiden 1994.  
2 On this critique in Olivi, see R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 236-47. For a comparison of Olivi and Auriol, see H.T. 
Adriaenssen, Peter John Olivi and Peter Auriol on Conceptual Thought, ‘Oxford Studies in Medieval 
Philosophy’, 2, 2014, pp. 67-97.   
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nothing more was needed than an act of perception or thought that was internally structured 
in such a way as to pertain to the tree rather than anything else.3 
 Like Olivi and Auriol, Ockham believed that according to the theory of species, all 
cognitive events involved both an act of perception and thought, and a further similitude or 
species. And again like his fellow Franciscans, Ockham was highly critical of this idea. 
Indeed, he looked upon it as an infringement of the principle of parsimony, according to 
which, other things being equal, simpler theories are always to be preferred over more 
complex competitors. Much like Olivi and Auriol, Ockham believed that the objects of 
perception and thought were represented to us by means of suitably structured acts of 
cognition. A theory introducing further devices such as species to account for representation, 
Ockham accordingly found, was unnecessarily complicated. But other than considerations of 
parsimony, what did Ockham believe was wrong with the theory of species? According to 
some commentators, Ockham was worried that species would become inner objects of 
cognition, and that from behind a ‘veil of species’, it would be impossible to say which 
representations do, and which representations do not, reliably represent the world. 4 This 
kind of  interpretation invites us to think of Ockham as a precursor of early modern 
philosophers who objected to representationalism on the ground that it made it impossible to 
compare reality with our ideas, and thus to ascertain the reliability of our representations.5 In 
this paper, however, I will qualify such readings, and argue that they sit uneasily with the 
broader context of Ockham’s epistemology.  
More precisely, the paper proceeds as follows. First, section 1 offers a general 
overview of Ockham’s concerns about the theory of species. In particular, it introduces an 
argument in which Ockham compares the way in which species represent their object to the 
way in which a statue of Hercules represents this Greek hero. This argument has been 
described as ‘Ockham’s most complex and impressive epistemological argument against 
species’, and I will henceforth refer to it as Ockham’s Hercules Argument. 6 Although some 
of the formulations that Ockham uses in developing this argument may give the impression 
that his critique of species was indeed motivated by worries about our capacity to 
discriminate between representations that deserve to be relied upon and representations that 
                                                          
3 For extensive discussion of Olivi’s theory of perceptual representation, see J. Toivanen, Perception and 
the Inner Senses. Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul, Brill, Leiden 2013, pp. 
115-225. On Auriol on intellectual cognition, see R. Friedman, Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol 
on Intellectual Thought and Consciousness, in G. Klima ed., Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental 
Representation in Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University Press, New York 2015, pp. 141-65.  
4 See, for example, E. Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition, in P. Spade ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Ockham, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, pp. 168-203, 180, and D. Perler, Things in the 
Mind, ‘Vivarium’, 34/2, 1996, pp. 231-53, 233. 
5 For some comparisons between medieval critiques of species and early modern criticisms of ideas, 
see F. Prezioso, La species medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno, Cedam, Milan 1963. More 
recently, see K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the 
Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden 1988, p. 44. Also D. Perler, Zweifel und Gewissheit. 
Skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter, Vittorio Klöstermann, Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 49.   
6 For this description, see R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, p. 249. 
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do not, section 2 will argue that such readings sit uneasily with Ockham’s broader 
epistemological views. Next, section 3 will offer an alternative reading of the Hercules 
Argument. Finally, section 4 will explore how Ockham’s Hercules Argument compares to an 
apparently similar argument in Ockham’s fellow Franciscan, John Peckham (1230-1292). 
 
 
1. The Hercules Argument 
 
As Ockham understands the theory of species, it holds that distal objects continuously 
propagate similitudes of themselves, or ‘species in medio’. It is this emission of species in 
medio that allows them to causally interact with distal objects, bridging the spatial gap 
between agent and patient. For example, when species in medio propagating from a tree 
impinge on the perceptual power of a human being, this brings about a certain effect there. 
More precisely, the impingement of species in medio on a perceptual power will result in a 
‘sensible species’ in that power, which functions as a representation of the tree, and which 
will trigger the formation of a perceptual act pertaining to it. The sensory data thus gathered 
then get processed by the intellectual powers of the soul, and this results in the formation of 
an ‘intelligible species’ that represents the tree’s nature to the intellect, and which is causally 
responsible for an intellectual act that engages with it.7    
 Ockham objects to all three kinds of species mentioned in this cameo presentation of 
the theory. Species in medio are simply not needed, he argues, because objects can causally 
interact with others from a distance.8 In principle, therefore, distal objects could immediately 
bring about sensible and intelligible species in our cognitive powers without the mediation 
of species in the medium. But if that is possible, Ockham reasons, then why should we not 
simply allow distal objects to immediately bring about our acts of perception and thought, 
without further species complicating the process? As he puts it in book II of the Reportatio: 
 
If the distant object can be the immediate cause of a species in the intellect … it can in 
the same way be the immediate cause of a sensory and intellectual act without any 
species9 
 
                                                          
7 On Ockham’s view of species as causes of our cognitive acts, see M. Adams, M. Wolter, John Duns 
Scotus: Memory and Intuition, ‘Franciscan Studies’ 53, 1993, pp. 175-230, 188. Also D. Perler, Theorien der 
Intentionalität, pp. 336-37.  
8 On Ockham on species in medio, see K. Tachau, The Problem of the species in medio at Oxford in the 
Generation after Ockham, ‘Mediaeval Studies’, 44, 1982, pp. 394-443, and A. Maier, Das Problem der 
species sensibiles in medio und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts, in idem, Ausgehendes 
Mittelalter, Vol. II, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Rome 1967, pp. 419-51. 
9 ‘[S]i obiectum distans potest esse causa immediata speciei in sensu et in intellectu …, eodem modo 
potest esse causa immediata actus sentiendi et intelligendi sine omni specie’. Reportatio II, qq. 12-13 
(OTh. V, p. 309). All references to Ockham are to the volumes of the Opera philosophica et theologica, ed. 
G. Gál et al, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure 1967-1988.  
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To be sure, Ockham was aware that species had been deemed necessary for the assimilation 
of subject and object of cognition. The reception of a species, philosophers such as Aquinas 
had said, was what rendered our perceptual and intellectual powers similar to their objects 
in the way required for cognition.10 But although he endorses the Aristotelian view that to 
cognize an object is for a power to become similar to that object, Ockham again sees no role 
for species. What renders our perceptual and intellectual powers similar to their objects, after 
all, is nothing but their very acts of perception and thought. In virtue of their inner 
structures, Ockham believes, these acts resemble certain objects, and so, it is simply by 
engaging in acts of perceiving and understanding that our cognitive powers assimilate 
themselves to their objects: in an act of perception ‘nothing other that assimilates is needed 
but the act of cognition’, and ‘the intellect is sufficiently assimilated to the object by an act of 
thought caused by it and received in the intellect’. Therefore, Ockham concluded, ‘no species 
is needed’.11 
But parsimony was not the only motive behind Ockham's critique of species. Indeed, 
there is  considerable consensus among commentators that Ockham understood species to be 
image-like entities that function as the primary objects of cognition. According to Leen 
Spruit, for example, Ockham thought of species as ‘iconic representations’ of their objects. 12  
Accordingly, Ockham’s repudiation of species is often seen as an attempt to safeguard the 
directness and immediacy of human cognition.13 Considerations of parsimony apart, 
therefore, what seems to be at stake in Ockham’s critique of species is a fundamental 
question about the way in which we cognitively reach out, as it were, to external reality. 
This way of reading Ockham has been taken to the task, however, by Claude 
Panaccio. Discussing Ockham’s various arguments against species, Panaccio writes that there 
is ‘nothing in his whole critique’ of species that presupposes a view of species as inner 
objects of apprehension. What is at issue in Ockham’s extensive criticism of the species 
theory, therefore, is really mostly considerations of parsimony, but not worries about a veil 
of representations being interposed between us and the external world.14  But if it is perhaps 
true to say that considerations of parsimony make for the lion’s share of Ockham’s 
discussion of species, Panaccio’s claim that Ockham’s criticism of species nowhere assumes 
them to be inner objects of apprehension is overstated.  And one place where this comes to 
the fore, is Ockham’s Hercules Argument, to be found in questions 12-13 of book II of the 
Reportatio. Here is how Ockham introduces the argument:  
                                                          
10 According to Aquinas, the intellect ‘assimilatur [rei] per speciem intelligibilem, quae est similitude 
rei intellectae’. Summa theologiae I, q. 14, ad 2.  
11 ‘[I]intuitiva non requiritur aliquid, praevium cognitioni, assimilans’, and ‘assimilatur intellectus 
sufficienter per intellectionem causatam ab obiecto et receptam in intellectu, igitur non requiritur 
species’. Rep. II, qq. 12-13 (OTh. V, p. 273). 
12 Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, p. 295. 
13 P. Alféri, Guillaume d’Occam et le singulier, Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1989, pp. 225-26; L. Spruit, 
Species Intelligibilis, pp. 292-93, and M. Millner, The Senses and the English Reformation, Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2011, p. 47. 
14 C. Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, Ashgate, Aldershot 2004, p. 30. 
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What is represented has to be cognized first; otherwise a representation would never 
lead to the cognition of what is represented as to something similar. For example: the 
statue of Hercules would never lead me to a cognition of Hercules if I had never seen 
Hercules before; nor can I know in another way whether the statue looks like him or 
not. But according to those who posit species, the species is something that precedes 
every act of cognizing an object, so that it cannot be posited for the representation of 
an object.15 
 
Schematically, the argument runs as follows:  
 
1. A statue makes me cognize Hercules only if already have cognitive access to him. 
2. The same goes for species. 
3. But the cognition of Hercules’s species precedes the cognition of Hercules. 
4. Therefore, the species of Hercules cannot make me cognize Hercules. 
5. Hence, a species is unfit to represent Hercules to me. 
 
In this argument, Ockham clearly takes species to be objects of apprehension. After all, I can 
only cognize Hercules by means of his statue if I am actually aware of the latter, and so, if 
statues and species do indeed represent in similar ways, species need to be cognized if we 
are to access the objects that they represent. This, in fact, was how the Hercules Argument 
was read by Ockham’s contemporary John of Reading (ca. 1285-1346) too. According to 
Reading, indeed, the argument successfully targeted species conceived of as entities that are 
themselves objects of cognition. In his eyes, however, it did not amount to a compelling 
argument against species conceived of as mere causal means, rather than as inner objects, of 
cognition.16  
 But if we access external objects via species much in the way in which we entertain 
past heroes by means of their statues, what does Ockham believe is so problematic about 
this? The linchpin of the Hercules Argument clearly is premise (1), but what exactly does it 
say? According to some commentators, Ockham is making the point that, unless we are 
acquainted with Hercules previous to and independently of his statue, we cannot establish to 
what extent the statue resembles him. Similarly, we could not determine whether a species 
                                                          
15 Item, repraesentatum debet esse prius cognitum; aliter repraesentans nunquam duceret in 
cognitionem repraesentati tanquam in simile. Exemplum: statua Herculis nunquam duceret me in 
cognitionem Herculis nisi prius vidissem Herculem; nec aliter possum scire utrum statua sit sibi 
similis aut non. Sed secundum ponentes speciem, species est aliquid praevium omni actui intelligendi 
obiectum, igitur non potest poni propter repraesentationem obiecti'. Rep. II, qq. 12-13 (OTh. V, p. 274). 
16 ‘Ad aliud, cum dicitur repraesentatum debet esse prius cognitum, verum est de illo quod est 
repraesentatum in aliqua similitudines, quae non tame nest ratio cognoscendi vel repraesentandi, sicut 
ponitur species, sed quod est etiam obiectum repraesentatum et cognitum, sicut est in exemplo 
posito’. G. Gál, Quaestio Ioannis de Reading de necessitate specierum intelligibilium defensio doctrinae Scoti, 
‘Franciscan Studies’, 29, pp. 66-156, 147-48. 
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adequately represents Hercules if we did not already know what Hercules looked like. As 
Dominik Perler summarizes the argument: 
 
If the intellect had no direct access to the thing itself, it could not compare the 
representation with the thing. Consequently, it could not judge whether or not the 
representation is correct.17  
 
Again, according to Eleonore Stump: 
 
Ockham asks how we could ever know whether the species represents reality 
correctly. In fact, Ockham argues, we can know one thing is a good representation of 
another only if we can have independent access to the thing represented. We would 
not know if a statue of Hercules was a good likeness of Hercules unless we had 
knowledge of Hercules himself.18  
 
Ockham’s remark that without previous acquaintance with Hercules, I cannot know 
‘whether the statue looks like him’ undeniably goes to suggest this kind of reading. Still,  
there are at least two reasons why we need to resist the idea that Ockham’s critique of 
species was mainly, or even to an important extent, driven by a concern that from behind the 
veil of species, we cannot ascertain whether or not a given representation can indeed be 
relied upon.  
 The first of these reasons is that it would be philosophically problematic for Ockham 
to raise this kind of point against his opponents: it would sit uneasily with the broader 
epistemological views that Ockham himself is committed to. This is a line of argument that 
will be further developed in section 2 below. The second reason is textual. Admittedly, 
Ockham in the Hercules Argument points out that without previous and independent 
cognition of Hercules we will not be able to say whether or not a representation adequately 
resembles him. But this appears to be the only place in Ockham’s critique of species where he 
raises the worry that we cannot compare representations with their objects in order to 
establish to what extent they are reliable guides to external reality. And even in the Hercules 
Argument, this worry comes as something of an afterthought: ‘nor can I know in another 
way whether the statue looks like him or not’.    
The focal point of the Hercules Argument, indeed, appears to be another one:  inner 
objects of apprehension ‘cannot be posited for the representation of an object’. And this claim 
is stronger than the claim that, if species are inner objects of apprehension, we have no 
means of establishing the quality of a given representation. Indeed, it is the claim that species 
conceived of as inner objects of cognition cannot function as representations of external 
                                                          
17 D. Perler, Things in the Mind, p.  233. 
18 E. Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition, p. 180. 
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objects at all. As we will find in section 3, in order to appreciate this claim in Ockham, it will 
be necessary to situate the Hercules Argument in the broader context of his writings.   
 
 
2.  Intuition, Criteria, and Knowledge 
 
There are at least two reasons why it would be philosophically problematic for Ockham to 
criticize his opponents for not being able to determine whether or not a given species reliably 
represents its object. The first of these is that Ockham himself is not immune from a similar 
objection either.  As we will see below, if the proponents of species have difficulty 
establishing whether or not a given representation deserves to be relied upon, then so has 
Ockham. The second reason why it would be problematic for Ockham to criticize his 
opponents on the grounds that they cannot ascertain the reliability of a given representation 
is that, if he himself is not immune from this sort of objection either, it is not clear just how 
much he thinks this is to be lamented. In other words, it is not clear that, according to 
Ockham, it is crucial that we be able always to pick out the rotten apples, and to discriminate 
between representations that do, and representations that do not deserve to be relied upon. 
But surely, Ockham can hardly hold his opponents to other standards than he does himself. 
Again, therefore, for Ockham to complain that the proponents of species cannot show that 
their representation of Hercules, or indeed any other person or object, is reliable, sits uneasy 
with his own further epistemological views.  
 To see that Ockham himself is not immune from criteriological problems either, it will 
be useful to briefly look at the way in which he develops his account of intuitive cognition in 
opposition to Duns Scotus (1266-1308). According to Scotus, our acts of simple, 
nonpropositional cognition neatly divide into two categories. On the one hand, there are 
those acts of simple cognition that pertain to objects that are actually existent or even present, 
and which moreover represent them as such.19 These are what Scotus terms ‘intuitive 
cognitions’. Paradigmatic examples include seeings, hearings, and other acts of sensory 
perception. On the other hand, there are simple cognitions that ‘abstract’ from the existence 
or presence of their objects, in that they either pertain to something absent or nonexistent, or, 
alternatively, pertain to an object that is present or existent but without representing it as 
such. Acts of the imagination are typical cases of abstractive cognition:  
 
Some cognition is in itself of an existent object, like that which attains an object in its 
proper actual existence. For instance, the vision of a colour, and, generally, external 
sensation. The other cognition is also of an object, yet not as it exists in itself. Rather, 
                                                          
19 ‘Alius autem actus intelligendi est … qui scilicet praecise sit de obiecti praesentis ut praesentis, et 
existentis ut existentis’. Quodlibet VI, in L. Wadding ed., Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis, Ordinis 
Minorum Opera Omnia, Vol. XXV, Vivès, Paris 1895, pp. 243-44.. 
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either the object does not exist, or at least that cognition is not of that object insofar as 
it actually exists. For instance, the imagination of a colour.20  
Scotus’s distinction between intuition and abstraction left a lasting mark on scholastic 
epistemology, and as Katherine Tachau has pointed out, the history of medieval 
epistemology and psychology from the early fourteenth century onwards ‘can be traced as a 
development of this dichotomy’.21  In the hands of later philosophers, however, Scotus’s 
original distinction often underwent considerable modification.  
  Ockham, for example, followed Scotus in drawing a distinction between intuition 
and abstraction, but characterized the two categories in a different way. According to 
Ockham, indeed, intuitive cognitions are simple apprehension ‘in virtue of which some 
contingent truth, especially about the present, can be evidently cognized’.22 Abstractive 
cognitions, by contrast, were simple apprehensions that did not lead to such evident 
cognition of contingent truths. As in Scotus, sense perception and imagination thus emerge 
as paradigmatic examples of intuition and abstraction respectively. Sense perception, after 
all, is precisely the kind of psychological mechanism in virtue of which we can normally 
come to evident cognition about contingent truths obtaining here and now. Acts of the 
imagination, by contrast, are not normally guides to evident beliefs about what is or is not 
contingently the case right now, and this makes them come out as abstractive cognitions in 
Ockham no less than in Scotus. Although Ockham and Scotus thus agree about the 
paradigmatic examples of intuition and abstraction, Ockham resists Scotus’s definition of 
these categories in terms of the existence or nonexistence, or presence or absence, of the 
objects to which they pertain. Rather, Ockham characterizes intuition and abstraction in 
terms of the different kinds of judgments that they enable.  
 The difference between the two Franciscans perhaps emerges most clearly in the way 
in which Ockham develops his idea that, although intuitions normally have actually existent 
objects, this need not always be the case. Whatever a creature can do, Ockham reasons, God 
can do too and so, if an oak can elicit in me the perception of an oak, God can bring about in 
me the very same perception even when the oak does not exist. God can bring about 
intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects, then, and to allow for this sort of supernatural 
intervention intuitive cognition must not be defined as a mode of cognition that is of an 
existent object as existent, or of a present object as present. Scotus’s account of intuition thus 
falters in the light of God’s absolute power. But when God supplants a creature’s causality 
and brings about in me the intuition of a nonexistent oak, the ensuing cognitive act still is 
                                                          
20 ‘Aliqua ergo cognitio est per se existentis, sicut quae attingit objectum in sua propria existentia 
actuali. Exemplum de visione coloris, et communiter in sensatione sensus exterioris. Aliqua etiam est 
cognitio objecti, non ut existentis in se, sed vel objectum non existit, vel saltem illa cognitio non est 
ejus, ut actualiter existentis. Exemplum, ut imaginatio coloris’. Quodlibet XIII, in Wadding XXV, p. 521. 
21 K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of 
Semantics 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden 1988, p. 81. 
22 ‘Universaliter, omnis notitia incomplexa … virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas 
contingens, maxime de praesenti, est noitita intuitiva’. Ordinatio, prol. q. 1 (OTh. I, pp. 31-2).  
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one in virtue of which ‘some contingent truth, especially about the present, can be evidently 
cognized’. Indeed, Ockham believes that a supernaturally caused intuition of a nonexistent 
oak will correctly lead me to believe that the oak I perceive does not now exist. He explains 
this surprising view as follows. Normally, when I have an intuitive cognition of an existent 
oak, both the oak itself and my act of intuition functions as partial causes of my judgment 
that the oak actually exists. But when one out of two partial causes is lacking, Ockham 
believes, it often happens that the remaining one produces an effect that is opposite to the 
effect that it would have brought about when conjoined with the other partial cause.23 Thus, 
when my intuition is severed from the existence of the oak, it does not cause the judgment 
that it would have caused when joined with the existence of the oak, but rather the opposite 
judgment that the oak does not exist. Accordingly, Ockham writes that ‘in virtue of an 
intuitive cognition of a thing, a thing can evidently be cognized not to be when it is not’.24 
 At this point, we get the impression that intuition, for Ockham, is a preeminently 
reliable mode of cognition. In fact, we might even be tempted to think of it as infallible.  
But this temptation must be resisted, for two reasons. Firstly, as Elizabeth Karger has 
convincingly argued, intuitive cognitions can in special situations naturally elicit erroneous 
judgments.25 Sense perceptions being precisely the kind of cognitions that can, in principle, 
give us knowledge about contingent matters of fact, Ockham classifies all acts of the external 
senses as intuitive cognitions. 26 But under sub-optimal circumstances, sense-perceptions 
may well lead to erroneous judgments. This, indeed, is how Ockham analyses perceptual 
illusions. For example, when I am traveling by boat, the motion of the boat may well distort 
my intuition of the motionless trees in such a way that I am led to judge that the trees are in 
motion. In this case, an intuitive cognition of the trees naturally leads to an erroneous 
judgment.27  
Secondly, God can sabotage our intuitions, so to speak. Suppose, for example, that 
God brings about in me an intuitive cognition of an oak that does not exist. Normally, this 
intuition would elicit the true judgment that the perceived oak does not exist. But God might 
                                                          
23 Ord. prol., q. 1 (Ord. I, p. 70-1). Cf. also Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 125-26. 
24 ‘[P]er notitiam intuitivam rei potest evidenter cognosci res non esse quando non est’.  Ord. prol., q. 1 
(OTh. I, p. 70). 
25 E. Karger, Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition, in P. Spade ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, pp. 204-225, 218-220.  
26 See Rep. III, q. 3 (OTh. VI, p. 110), and E. Karger, Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory, p. 225 
27 Stump has challenged Karger's reading by pointing to Ockham's account of afterimages. 
Afterimages, for him, are qualities impressed on the eye, which under special circumstances become 
objects of intuition. And when this happens, Ockham thinks, we come to endorse the correct judgment 
that an afterimage exists. Even under suboptimal circumstances, Stump apparently wants to maintain, 
intuitive cognitions lead to correct judgments on Ockham’s account See E. Stump, The Mechanisms of 
Cognition, 187. But while this may be correct for afterimages, in the case of the seemingly moving trees 
on the shore what is judged to exist (trees in motion) is certainly different from what is actually 
intuited (motionless trees). Hence, Stump's appeal to afterimages does not shake Karger's general 
claim, namely, that under special but natural circumstances, intuitive cognitions can occasionally elicit 
false judgments.  
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sabotage my intuition and prevent it from exercising its ordinary causal activity. Indeed, he 
might prevent it from bringing about any judgment at all and instead bring about a 
judgment himself: the false judgment that the oak does exist.28 In the same vein, God might 
also prevent an intuitive cognition of an existent object from causing in me the evident 
judgment that the object exists and bring about instead the false belief that the object does 
not exist.29  
So intuitive cognition is not an infallible mechanism. Some intuitions give us 
knowledge about external reality, others do not. But can we tell which do and which do not? 
No. Ockham does not offer any means to introspectively discriminate between intuitions that 
lead to true judgments and intuitions that lead to false judgments.30 And of course he cannot 
claim some kind of objective vantage point from which to compare reality as his cognitions 
present it to him with reality as it is in itself. Again, we cannot tell whether or not a given 
intuition has been sabotaged by God. And the upshot of this is that on Ockham's own 
account, we cannot tell whether or not a given act that represents an external object to us will 
give us knowledge about that object. As T. Scott has concluded, on Ockham's account, ‘even 
if we sometimes do know, we can never know that we know’.31 In like spirit, Luciano Cova 
has written that Ockham's failure to offer a means to phenomenologically distinguish 
between veridical and illusory cognitions ‘would hinder us in founding an absolute certainty 
on the basis of which experimental and formal sciences can be developed’. Indeed, on 
Ockham's account, ‘we can never know that we know’.32  
And this gives us our first reason to doubt whether Ockham can unproblematically 
raise criteriological difficulties for his opponents. For as we see now, it is not clear that 
Ockham himself is any better off than the proponents of species whom he criticizes. Just as 
the defender of species cannot tell whether or not a given species reliably resembles 
Hercules, Ockham cannot tell whether or not a given intuition leads to a reliable judgment 
about external reality. And the second reason to doubt whether Ockham can 
unproblematically raise criteriological questions for the theory of species, is that it is unclear 
just how much weight he generally attaches to such questions. That is, it is not clear that, in 
                                                          
28 ‘Tamen Deus potest causare actum creditivum per quem credo rem esse praesentem quae est 
absens. Et dico quod illa cognitio creditiva erit abstractiva, non intuitiva; et per talem actum fidei 
potest apparere res esse praesens quando est absens’. Quodlibet. V, q. 5 (OTh. IX, p. 498). Ockham is 
here using ‘abstractive’ in a broad sense, in which every cognition that is not intuitive is abstractive. 
For this use of ‘abstractive’, see Rep. II, qq. 12-13 (OTh. V, p. 257).  Also M. Adams, William Ockham, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1987, p. 503.  
29 Compare Ord.  prol., q. 1 (OTh. I, p. 70): ‘forte non est inconveniens quod res intuitive videatur et 
tamen quod intellectus ille credat rem non esse, quamvis naturaliter non possit hoc fieri’. 
30 L. Cova, Francesco di Meyronnes e Walter Catton nella controversia scolastica sulla notitia intuitiva de re 
non existente, ‘Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale’, 2, 1976, pp. 227-52, 248-9. 
31 T. Scott, Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition, ‘Journal of the History of Philosophy’, 7/1, 1969, 
pp. 27-49, 45.  Also J. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1964, p. 259.  
32 Cova, Francesco di Meyronnes, pp. 248-49. Compare L. Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume 
d’Ockham. Étude des notions fondamentales, P. Lethielleux, Paris 1967, p. 177. 
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Ockham’s epistemology, it is crucial that we base our beliefs upon representations that are 
not only reliable as a matter of fact, but which, in addition, are known to be so by us and 
recognized as such.    
This comes to the fore in his discussion of knowledge in Ockham’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics. There, he distinguishes between four senses of ‘knowledge’. In all four 
senses, knowing involves assenting to a true proposition.33 In the first, knowledge is just ‘a 
certain cognition of a proposition that is true; and in this way there are some things that we 
know on the basis of faith only’. 34 For example, to know that the wall is white, in this sense, 
it suffices for me to truly believe that the wall is white on the mere basis of someone telling 
me. Having knowledge in this first sense does not require that I be able to ascertain that the 
source of my information is in fact trustworthy. Rather, it is the de facto reliability of my 
source that matters to Ockham’s first sense of knowledge. And we see something similar in 
the second sense of ‘knowledge’. In this sense, knowledge is an ‘evident cognition’ that 
results when we assent to a proposition,  not merely on the basis of hearsay, but in virtue of 
the noncomplex cognition of the referents of its terms.35 For example, I evidently cognize that 
the wall is white when I assent to the proposition ‘the wall is white’ in virtue of the 
noncomplex cognition the wall and the whiteness that is in it: 
 
Thus, when no one would tell me that the wall is white, I would nevertheless know 
that the wall is white on the basis of my very perception of the whiteness that is in the 
wall, and things work similarly in other cases. And in this way knowledge does not 
only pertain to what is necessary, but also regards some things that are contingent. 36   
 
Clearly, my noncomplex cognition of the wall and its whiteness will have to be an intuitive 
cognition since, as we have seen, Ockham thinks that it is precisely intuitions that yield 
evident cognitions about contingent matters of fact. In other words, in order for me to know 
that the wall is white, the following three conditions need to be met:  
 
                                                          
33 For discussion, see Panaccio, Ockham’s Externalism, in G. Klima ed., Intentionality, Cognition, and 
Mental Representation, pp. 166-85, 181-83.  
34 ‘Et sunt variae distinctiones scientiae, etiam non subordinatae. Una est quod scientia uno modo est 
certa notitia alicuius very; et sic sciuntur aliqua per fidem tantum’. Expositio in libris Physicorum, prol. 
par. 2 (OPh. IV, p. 5). The certainty of this ‘certa notitia’ appears to be psychological certainty, as 
Ockham later on the same page proceeds to rephrase the condition of certainty in terms of ‘firm 
adherence’ to a proposition: ‘quia tamen eis sine omni dubitatione adhaeremus et sunt vera, dicimur 
scire illa’.   
35 ‘Aliter accipitur scientia pro evidenti notitia, quando scilicet aliquid dicitur sciri non tantum propter 
testimonium narrantium, sed etsi nullus narraret hoc esse, ex notitia aliqua incomplexa terminorum 
aliquorum mediate vel immediate assentiremus ei’.  Exp. Phys., prol. par. 2 (OPh. IV, p. 5). See also 
Ord.  prol., q. 1 (OTh. I, p. 5). 
36‘Sicut si nullus narraret mihi quod paries est albus, ex hoc ipso quod video albedinem quae est in 
pariete, scirem quod paries est albus; et ita est de aliis. Et isto modo scientia non est tantum 
necessariorum, immo etiam est de aliquorum contingentium’. Exp. Phys,. prol., par. 2 (OPh. IV, p. 6). 
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i. The wall is white, 
ii. I intuitively cognize the wall and its whiteness, and 
iii. I am thereby led to assent to the proposition ‘the wall is white’. 
 
The important thing to note at this point, is that according to these conditions, I can know 
that the wall is white even though I may not be able to establish that the cognitions that led 
me to my assent were indeed veridical intuitions. In order for my assent to the proposition 
that the wall is white to count as knowledge, it is required that this assent be based upon 
veridical intuitions of the wall and its colour. There is no fourth requirement, however, 
stipulating that in order for such veridical intuitions to yield knowledge of the wall’s 
whiteness, I need to recognize them as such.37  
 Put in other terms, Ockham appears to have believed that in order for representations 
to give us knowledge, it is necessary that they are conducive to true beliefs. It is not required, 
however, that we be able to tell whether or not they have this property. But if Ockham can 
know that the wall is white without being able to tell that the representations that led him to 
believe that the wall is white were veridical, it seems he must grant that a proponent of 
species can know that Hercules was tall on the basis of a species even though he cannot tell 
whether or not the species reliably represented Hercules. If Ockham can know that the wall 
is white without necessarily knowing that he knows, then so can his opponents. Taking the 
proponents of species to the task for not being able to ascertain the reliability of a given 
representation, therefore, sits uneasily with Ockham's own epistemological commitments.   
  
 
3.  Hercules in Context 
 
If criticizing his opponents for not being able to ascertain the reliability of their 
representations does not fit easily with Ockham’s broader epistemological views, neither 
does it appear to have been the main point of his Hercules Argument. Indeed, as we saw 
above, his remark there that ‘not can I know in another way whether the statue looks like 
him or not’ comes as something of an afterthought. The key to the Hercules Argument, 
rather, seems to lie in its concluding remark, that species ‘cannot be posited for the 
representation of an object’. But why does Ockham believe that this is so?  
To address that question, it will be useful to put his Hercules Argument in the 
broader context of Ockham’s writings. More precisely, it will be instructive to turn to the 
prologue to his Ordinatio, where Ockham extensively reviews the idea that ‘the cognition of a 
                                                          
37As Claude Panaccio and David Piché have recently put it: ‘it is sufficient for human knowledge, 
according to Ockham, that the relevant causal conditions should be fulfilled in fact. He does not take it 
to be necessary, in addition, that we should know that they are so fulfilled’. C. Panaccio and D. Piché, 
Ockham’s Reliabilism and the Intuition of Non-Existents, in H. Lagerlund ed., Rethinking the History of 
Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background, Brill, Leiden 2010, pp. 97-118,  116. See also D. Perler, 
Zweifel und Gewissheit, pp. 235-39 and C. Panaccio, Ockham’s Externalism, pp. 180-84.  
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similitude, such as a statue, causes the cognition of that of which it is a similitude’. 38 
According to this idea, the perception of a statue can make me think of Hercules, and 
similarly, the apprehension of a species representative of Hercules can make me think of 
him. Put differently, according to this idea, both statues and species can be ‘posited for the 
representation’ of Hercules. To appreciate Ockham’s claim that they cannot, therefore, we 
need to understand how he responds to the idea that similitudes can make us cognitively 
entertain the objects they resemble.  
First of all, Ockham grants that similitudes that are themselves objects of cognition 
can cause in us the recollection of an object we are already acquainted with. If I am already 
acquainted with Hercules, for example, seeing a similitude of him may well cause me to 
recall Hercules to mind. But if I am not already acquainted with him, seeing his similitude 
will not lead to me cognize Hercules. 39 And for Ockham, this is an instance of a general 
principle saying that the cognition of one singular object will never lead me to cognize 
another that I am not already acquainted with: 
 
The cognition of one singular, together with the intellect, is never a sufficient cause of 
the cognition of another singular thing.40  
 
But what exactly does this principle say, and how does it apply to the Hercules Argument?  
According to Robert Pasnau, who has drawn attention to the relevance of this principle for 
understanding the Hercules Argument, Ockham’s point here is that inferential processes are 
needed to go from cognition of one object to cognition of another. For example, in order to go 
from seeing smoke to apprehending that there is a fire, I need to make an inference along the 
following lines: There is smoke. But whenever there is smoke, there is fire. Therefore, there is 
a fire somewhere.41 Similarly, when I see a statue of Hercules, this can only give me cognition 
of Hercules’s traits if I go though an inference such as: Hercules’s statue is tall. The statue is 
an accurate representation of Hercules. Therefore, Hercules was tall. The main point of the 
                                                          
38 ‘Praeterea, notitia similitudinis, sicut statuae, causat notitiam illius cuius est similitudo’. Ord. prol. q. 
9  (OTh. I, p. 251). 
39 ‘[D]ucitur in actum rememorandi de Hercule et non in notitiam primam ipsius Herculis’. Ord. prol. 
q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 254).   
40 ‘[N]otitia unius singularis nunquam est causa sufficiens -- cum intellectu -- notitiae alterius rei 
singularis’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 254). Ockham formulated this principle in response to Scotus’s 
claim that the primary object of any particular science ‘virtually contains’ all truths pertaining to that 
science. In particular, Scotus held that knowledge of such a subject virtually included knowledge of its 
attributes. For a detailed discussion, see Dominique Demange, Objet premier d’inclusion virtuelle. 
Introduction à la théorie de la science de Jean Duns Scot. In E. Karger, J.-L. Solère, G. Sondag eds., Duns 
Scot à Paris (1302-2002), Turnhout, Brepols 2004, pp. 89-116.  
41 Compare: ‘videns fumum sine igne arguit quod talis fumus causabatur ab igne, quia alias 
praesentiam ignis vidit fumum causari, et sic cognoscit ignem esse causam per suum effectum’. 
Quodlibet I, q. 7 (OTh. IX, p. 40). For discussion, see also Adams, William Ockham, p. 792. 
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Hercules Argument, accordingly, would be that if all perception is mediated by the 
apprehension of species, all perceptual cognition would be inferential.42  
 On this reading, Ockham’s principle that the cognition of one singular does not lead 
us to cognition of another object that we are unfamiliar with, is a principle about 
propositional cognition. Inferences, after all, allow us to go from one proposition to another, 
and they do not obtain between simple, nonpropositional acts of cognizing. 43  
But when Ockham says that the cognition of one object does not lead to the cognition of 
another object that we are as yet unacquainted with, his claim is not about propositional 
cognition at all. His point is rather that, when I apprehend some singular object, this does not 
lead me to a simple conception of something that I do not already know. The cognition of 
one thing, Ockham writes, does not lead me to ‘the first noncomplex cognition of another 
thing’.44 
 At first, this claim may look surprising. After all, suppose that I come home after a 
day’s work, and find my front door has been forced open. This discovery immediately leads 
me to think of the burglar.  To be sure, I do not know who he is, but the discovery of my 
damaged door causes me to picture him in general terms as the man, whoever he is, who has 
broken into my home. This conception is a nonpropositional cognition of a burglar whom I 
am not already familiar with, and it is a conception caused by the mere perception of my 
damaged door. In spite of Ockham’s claim to the contrary, then, it is apparently possible for 
the cognition of one singular to lead me to the first noncomplex cognition of something else 
that I am not otherwise acquainted with.  
 However, when he writes that the cognition of one thing does not lead me the first 
noncomplex cognition of another, Ockham is having a mind a very specific point. And this 
point is not that the cognition of one object cannot give me any simple conception of another 
thing at all. Rather, his point is that the cognition of one object does not lead me to cognize 
an otherwise unfamiliar object ‘in itself’: 
  
And therefore it was said before that the cognition of one external thing is not 
sufficient to lead (with the help of the intellect) to the first simple cognition of another 
thing in itself.45 
 
When he writes that the cognition of one object is insufficient to lead to the first simple 
cognition of another thing ‘in itself’, Ockham is making a technical point. As he explains: 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, p. 253.  
43 Compare: ‘notitia discursiva, qualis solum est inter complexa’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 255). 
44 It does not lead to ‘notitiam primam incomplexam alterius rei’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 254).  
45 ‘Et ideo dictum est prius quod notitia unius rei extra non ducit sufficienter, cum intellectu, in 
notitiam primam incomplexam alterius rei in se’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 254). 
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And I say that a cognition is of a thing in itself when by neither that simple cognition 
nor by any part of it something different from that thing is cognized.46 
 
To be a cognition of some one thing in itself, then, a cognition first of all must uniquely refer 
to that object. But having a unique reference is not enough. Thus, although our conception of 
God as a supremely good, wise, and charitable being uniquely refers to God, Ockham denies 
that it is a conception of God in himself. And the reason is that the content of this conception 
involves many other things than just God, such as goodness, wisdom, and charity, none of 
which coincide with God.47 Despite its unique reference to God, then, our conception of God 
as a supremely wise, good, and charitable being is not a simple cognition such that ‘nothing 
different’ from God is cognized. 
 This helps to see how apparently obvious counterexamples to Ockham’s claim that 
cognition of one object does not lead to the simple cognition of an otherwise unfamiliar 
object can be dealt with. Again consider the case where, upon finding my door being forced 
open, I come to think of the man who broke into my house. Although my conception may 
uniquely refer to the burglar, it is not a cognition of the burglar in himself, because the 
content of my cognition involves many other things than just the burglar: it includes me, my 
house, and the event of breaking into my house. The real point of Ockham’s claim that the 
apprehension of one singular does not engender the simple cognition of other object that is 
otherwise unfamiliar was that the cognition of one singular does not yield the first cognition 
of another object in itself. And that point remains unaffected by the apparently problematic 
burglar example. 
 Moreover, now that we have a better idea of Ockham’s point in saying that the 
cognition of one object does not lead to the simple cognition of an otherwise unfamiliar 
object, we have also acquired an important key to the Hercules Argument.  For when 
someone who is already acquainted with Hercules sees a statue of Hercules, this will likely 
incite him to call up Hercules before his mind's eye. But when someone who lacks previous 
acquaintance with Hercules sees the same statue, this may lead him to think of ‘a Greek 
hero’, or ‘an ancient warrior’, or ‘a tall bearded man’. But none of these cognitions succeeds 
in uniquely picking out Hercules: as Ockham points out, they no more pertain to Hercules 
than to Achilles.48 They fail as cognitions of Hercules in himself, that is. Again, when 
someone who is unfamiliar with Hercules runs into his statue is thereby made to conceive of 
‘the man, whoever he is, who sat for the sculptor of this statue’, this thought succeeds in 
                                                          
46 ‘Et voco notitiam rei in se quando illa incomplexa cognitione nec aliqua parte ipsius aliquid aliud ab 
illa re intelligitur’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, pp. 254-55). 
47 ‘Deus in se non cognoscitur, quia aliquid aliud a Deo hic cognoscitur, quia omnes termini istius 
propisitionis ‘aliquod ens est sapientia’, ‘iustitia’, ‘caritas’, et sic de aliis, sunt quidam conceptus 
quorum nullus est realiter Deus, et tamen omnes isti termini cognoscuntur’. Ord. d. 3. q. 2 (OTh. II, pp. 
404-5). For discussion, see J. Pelletier, William of Ockham on Metaphysics: The Science of Being and God, 
Brill, Leiden 2013, p. 177. 
48 ‘Unde si aliquis videret statuam Herculis, et nullam notitiam penitus haberet de Hercule, non plus 
per hoc cogitaret de Hercule quam de Achille’. Ord. prol. q. 9 (OTh. I, p. 254).  
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uniquely referring to Hercules, but it still fails as a cognition pertaining to Hercules in 
himself, insofar as many other things than Hercules enter in the content of this cognition: the 
sculptor, the statue itself, and indeed the act of sitting for the sculptor. 
 Again, if cognizing Hercules via his species is like cognizing him via his statue, as 
Ockham’s argument assumes, then apprehending a species of Hercules will lead me to 
conceive of Hercules under some kind of description. Perhaps I will come to think of him as 
just a bearded man. But that, as we have already seen, is not a conception of Hercules in 
himself. Alternatively, I may come to conceive of Hercules as the man represented by my 
cognitive image. This conception succeeds in uniquely picking out Hercules, but it does not 
engage with Hercules in himself. And the reason is that, again, this conception does not only 
entertain the individual Hercules, but its content furthermore engages my own cognitive 
image and the concept of being a man. Picking up Ockham’s own terminology, something 
‘different from‘ Hercules himself is also cognized in my conception and its parts. And as a 
result, it fails as a cognition of Hercules in himself.   
 The only scenario in which the apprehension of a species can lead me to engage with 
Hercules in himself, then, would appear to be a scenario where I already have a conception 
of Hercules in himself. In such a scenario, my apprehension of the species might make me 
call up that conception just as the perception of any image might call up in me memories of 
previously perceived objects. However, it is unclear that this scenario is really feasible. More 
precisely, it is unclear where the conception of Hercules in himself that my apprehension of 
his species must call up is supposed to come from. Presumably, neither Ockham nor his 
opponents think we have an innate conception of Hercules in himself, and this means that 
any such conception must have come from experience. But experience, according to the 
theory of species as Ockham understands it, is mediated by the apprehension of species, and 
this, as we have just seen, cannot give us a conception of Hercules in himself. In the end, 
therefore, it appears that there is no way at all in which the apprehension of Hercules’s 
species can make me cognitively engage Hercules in himself. It fails to engender in me a 
conception of Hercules in himself, and it unclear how the apprehension of a species of 
Hercules could ever call up in me a conception of Hercules in himself. And it is in this way, I 
propose, that Ockham’s claim that a species ‘cannot be posited for the representation of a 
thing’ is borne out. 
 As we saw in section 1, Ockham’s Hercules Argument was discussed by John of 
Reading, who argued that, although it admittedly posed a problem for species conceived of 
as inner objects of cognition, it did not amount to a case against species understood as 
merely causal means of cognition, which are not themselves apprehended. Some years 
before Ockham formulated his critique of species, however, his confrere John Peckham had 
already presented an objection to the theory of species akin to the Hercules Argument. But 
other than either Ockham or Reading, Peckham believed that this argument could be 
addressed without necessarily giving up the idea that species are similitudes that we 
apprehend. Taking a brief look at Peckham’s discussion will help us see why this conclusion 
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would not convince Ockham, and thus to understand how his Hercules Argument is subtly 
different from other, apparently similar, arguments in contemporary authors.  
 
 
4.   Ockham and Peckham 
 
In his questions De anima, the Franciscan theologian John Peckham defends his theory of 
species by going through a number of possible objections that might be raised against it. One 
of these arguments goes as follows: 
 
Nothing is cognized by means of something else that is similar to it unless the thing it 
resembles is cognized first, just as the absolute must be known before that which is 
relative to it. Thus, two things that are similar to each other must first be cognized in 
themselves before one of them is cognized as similar to the other. Therefore, if a thing 
is cognized through a similitude insofar as it is a similitude, it is first known to be 
similar and thus is cognized before that to which it relates, which is impossible.49 
 
Species represent their objects by resembling them, the argument goes, but in order for any 
species to function as a representation to me, I have to be able to recognize it as a similitude 
of its object. However, in order to recognize a species as a similitude of its object, I already 
need to have some conception of that object. Species cannot make me think of anything that I 
am not already acquainted with, therefore. And this means that the theory of species falters 
upon a dilemma. Either species succeed in representing objects to me, but then I must 
already have conceptions of these objects and so the theory of species presupposes rather 
than explains my cognitive access to things. Or the theory does not presuppose that I have 
cognitive access to things, but then it becomes unclear that species can make anything 
present to me but themselves.  
 The worry that species cannot make us think of anything we are not already 
acquainted with, as we have seen, takes center stage in Ockham’s critique of species. Also, 
the point of Peckham’s argument that the theory of species fails as an account of 
representation is reminiscent of Ockham’s claim that species cannot be  ‘posited for the 
representation of an object’. The argument against species that we get in Peckham’s 
questions on the soul, then, looks akin to the Hercules Argument in Ockham. But where 
Ockham takes the Hercules Argument to point to a serious weakness of the species theory, 
Peckham believes that his argument can be answered. Crucially, his answer relies on a 
                                                          
49 ‘[N]ihil cognoscitur per alterum in quantum simile nisi praecognito illo cui est simile, sicut prius 
absolutum quam relativum. Ita prius cognoscuntur extrema similitudinis in se quam unum 
cognoscitur alteri esse simile. Ergo si res cognoscitur per similitudinem in quantum similitudo est, 
prius cognoscitur esse similis et ita prius cognoscitur eius correlativum, quod est impossibile'. 
Questiones de anima, qq. 9-10, in Ioannis Peckham quaestiones disputatae, ed. G. Etzkorn, Ad Claras Aquas, 
Rome 2002, p. 425.  
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distinction between ‘simple cognition by contuition’, and ‘complex cognition by 
comparison’.   
I engage in the latter sort of cognition, Peckham explains, when I come to form such 
judgments as ‘this representation is a reliable similitude of that object’, or ‘this picture poorly 
resembles its original’. And unless I arbitrarily came to hold this sort of judgment, forming it 
does indeed require that, independently of each other, I have access both to the 
representation and the thing it allegedly resembles. For simple cognition by contuition, 
however, this need not be the case. Indeed, when one has such a cognition of a species, ‘the 
cognitive power by means of one and the same act is turned to the species and that of which 
it is a species’.50  
Peckham’s claim here makes reference to a concept that takes centre stage in 
Bonaventure’s theory of divine illumination. As we learn in his De scientia Christi, ‘every 
creature relates to God as a trace, as an image, and as a likeness’.51 Consequently, we need to 
look upon the sensible world as ‘a mirror through which we may pass to God’.52 More 
precisely, we need to look upon the world as a ‘trace’ bearing witness of its creator, 
recognizing God in every tree and every stone. As Bonaventure explains in his Itinerarium 
mentis in Deum, ‘the created beings of this sensible world signify the invisible things of God 
partly because God is the origin, exemplar, and goal of all creation, and every effect is a sign 
of its cause; every copy is a sign of its exemplar; and the road is a sign of the goal to which it 
leads’.53 This process of recognizing the creator in his creation, now, is what Bonaventure 
terms ‘contuition’. Somehow, that is, in intuiting the things around us, we ‘contuit’ their 
creator, and it is this mode of cognition that puts us in contact with the Ideas in accordance 
                                                          
50 ‘Est enim duplex cognitio: simplex per contuitionem, et composita per collationem. In primo genere 
cognitionis, virtus cognitiva eodem actu converitur super speciem et super illud cuius est. In secundo 
genere oportet praecognoscere’. Quaestiones de anima 9-10, in Questiones disputatae, p. 433. In his 
commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas had similarly written that ‘in speciem vel in imaginem 
contingit fieri duplicem conversionem: vel secundum quod est species talis rei, et tunc est eadem 
conversion in rem et speciem rei; vel in speciem secundum quod est res quaedam’. II Sent. d. 4, q. 1, a. 
1, ad 4. In Aquinas, this claim arguably needs to be understood against the background of his idea that 
species are formally identical with their objects. The species of x, on this account, just is the very form 
of x, insofar as it is instantiated in a cognitive power. Accordingly, for that power to turn to the species 
of x is to turn to the very thing that gives x its identity. For discussion, see D. Perler, Essentialism and 
Direct Realism: Some Late Medieval Perspectives, ‘Topoi’, 19/2, 2000, pp. 111-122, 115-16. It is not clear, 
however, that the same idea is at work in Peckham’s claim here as well. For, as Caleb Colley has 
recently argued, an intelligible species for Peckham ‘leads to cognition because of its similarity, but 
not its identity, to the material form’. C. Colley, Peckham on Life and Mind, unpublished dissertation, 
University of South Carolina 2014, p. 133.   
51 ‘Creatura enim comparatur ad Deum in ratione vestigii, imaginis, et similitudinis’. De scientia Christi 
4, in Opera Omnia, Vol. V, ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi, Florence 1901, p. 24. 
52 ‘[P]onendo totum istum mundum sensibilem nobis tanquam speculum, per quod transeamus ad 
Deum’. Itinerarium mentis in Deum 1.9, ed. P. Boehner, Z. Hayes, Franciscan Institute Publications, St. 
Bonaventure 2003, pp. 51-2.  
53 ‘Significant autem huiusmodi creaturae huius mundi sensibilis invisibilia Dei, partim quia Deus est 
omnis creaturae origo, exemplar et finis, et omnis effectus est signum causae, et exemplum 
exemplaris, et via finis, ad quem ducit’. Itinerarium 2.12, pp.  78-9. 
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with which the world was made.54 And it is in a similar way, Peckham suggests, that, in 
apprehending a species, we are simultaneously brought in contact with that to which the 
species pertains. The species of a tree, Peckham wants to say, can somehow make its object 
present to me just as the tree itself can give me some kind of cognitive access to God, even 
though I may no more have species-independent access to the tree than I know God 
otherwise than in and through creation.  
But although Peckham’s response may go some way in addressing the problem that 
he himself had raised for species, it does not take away what I have argued is the 
fundamental problem of Ockham’s Hercules Argument. After all, when I recognize the 
creator in the things around me, the perception of a tree or a stone will normally cause me to 
engage God under some kind of description. That is, recognizing the creator in his cratures 
will normally cause in me such conceptions as  ‘the ultimate cause of this tree’, or ‘the first 
cause of the entire world I see around me’. Typically, indeed, this will be the kind of 
conception that contuition can give me. A more detailed conception of God would arguably 
require the kind of face to face cognition of the creator that cannot be had in this life. 
When Peckham applies the concept of contuition to the theory of species, therefore, 
the suggestion is as follows. When I apprehend the species of an object that I am otherwise 
unfamiliar with, this will make me conceive of that object roughly as ‘the external cause of 
this image’. Alternatively, when I apprehend a species of an object that I am not already 
acquainted with, I may come to conceive of that object under such descriptions as ‘something 
like this’ or ‘whatever corresponds to this image’. Again, I engage with the object in sync 
with its species: I contuit the former in its representation.  
But at this point, it is not hard to see why Ockham would not find this answer 
satisfactory. For just as ‘the ultimate cause of this tree’ and ‘the first cause of the universe’ are 
not conceptions of God in himself, to think of an object as ‘something like this’ or ‘whatever 
corresponds to the picture I form’ is not to think of that object in itself. With his appeal to 
contuition, Peckham has argued that the apprehension of species may well succeed in giving 
us some conception of their objects, even though we may not have access to these objects 
otherwise than via their species. But what his appeal does not address, is the worry 
motivating the Hercules Argument in Ockham: the worry that, blocking previous 
acquaintance that is not mediated by species, the apprehension of inner representations does 
not give us access to things in themselves. 
 
 
                                                          
54 As Jacques-Guy Bougerol summarizes, contuition for Bonaventure is a ‘connaissance médiate, c’est-
à-dire, saisie intellectuelle de la présence de l’Etre infini dans et par l’être fini’. J.-G. Bougerol, Lexique 
Saint Bonaventure, Éditions Franciscaines, Paris 1969, p. 42. On Bonaventure on contuition, see also L. 
Bowman, The Cosmic Exemplarism of Bonaventure, ‘The Journal of Religion’, 55/2, 1975, pp. 181-98, 197; 
I. Delio, Simply Bonaventure. An Introduction to his Life, Thought, and Writings, New City Press, New 
York 2001, p. 63, and T. Scarpelli Cory, Bonaventure’s Christocentric Epistemology: Christ’s Human 
Knowledge as the Epitome of Illumination in ‘De Scientia Christi’, ‘Franciscan Studies’, 65, 2007, pp. 63-86,  
69-71.  
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Conclusion 
 
Famously, Ockham rejected the theory of species to replace it with an act theory of 
representation. The representation of external objects, he argued, is not mediated by special 
representational devices such as sensible or intelligible species, but is carried out by suitably 
structured acts of perception and thought. His criticism of species is partially motivated by 
considerations of parsimony, but these do not tell the whole story.  Indeed, Ockham also sees 
species as inner objects of cognition, which mediate our access to reality in much the same 
way in which a statue of Hercules mediates our cognitive access to this Greek hero.  
 But just what is wrong with this picture of cognition, according to Ockham? On the 
basis of what I have called Ockham’s Hercules Argument, some scholars have argued that 
Ockham worries that, from behind a veil of species, it would be impossible to compare a 
species to its original, and thus to assess the quality of any given representation. This paper 
has argued, however, that such readings are problematic on both philosophical and textual 
grounds. They are philosophically problematic, in that for Ockham to raise this sort of worry 
for the species sits uneasily with his own epistemological standards. They are textually 
problematic, because the main point of Ockham’s Hercules Argument, is not that we cannot 
compare species with their originals to ascertain their reliability. Rather, the point is that, 
independently of whether or not we can ascertain the reliability of a given species, the 
apprehension of similitudes just is not the kind of mechanism that can make anything 
present to us that we are not already familiar with. This was a worry that, before Ockham, 
had already been discussed by his fellow Franciscan John Peckham. But whereas Peckham 
thought the problem could be addressed by harkening back to the Bonaventurian concept of 
contuition, we have seen that Peckham’s answer fails to take away the fundamental problem 
of Ockham’s Hercules Argument: the problem that, from behind the veil of species, access to 
things  ‘in themselves’ remains foreclosed.  
 
   
   
   
 
 
